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The independence of the European Court of Auditors 
Nikos Vogiatzis∗ 
This article considers the independence of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) from a 
formal, legal perspective. It argues that the primary constitutional justification behind such 
independence is the ECA’s need to act on behalf of and defend the EU interest. The paper 
discusses several dimensions of independence, including the appointment process, the number 
of ECA Members, the independence in the ECA’s functions (both from the member states and 
the EU institutions). Proposals for amendment of the existing legal framework are also 
explored, the most important of which is to put the European Parliament on an equal footing 
with the Council in the appointment process. Underlining that independence should not be 
conflated with accessibility, though, toward the end of the article the ECA is invited to further 
improve its communication policy and translate its findings in a more effective way. 
1. Introduction: The role of the European Court of Auditors and why its independence 
matters 
The European Court of Auditors (hereinafter ECA, Court of Auditors) is the EU institution 
responsible for carrying out the EU’s external audit, under Articles 285 and 287 TFEU. The 
ECA gained its status as an institution (featuring now in Article 13(1) TEU) under the 
Maastricht Treaty, evidence of ‘clear recognition of the need to enhance the authority of the 
Court and to elevate it to a status equivalent to those institutions over which it had auditing 
power’.1 The ECA commenced its work in 1977, effectively replacing the weaker Audit Board 
of the European Communities.2 Particularly influential in its establishment was the European 
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Parliament, and notably Heinrich Aigner (later on chair of the Budgetary Control Committee), 
pushing for the urgent need to strengthen the external control over the EU budget.3 
The ECA’s audit functions can principally be divided into two categories: compliance and 
performance audit.4 In the first case, the ECA checks the legality and regularity of transactions. 
The Treaty of Maastricht required the ECA to issue a Statement of Assurance (SoA)5 ‘as to the 
reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions’.6 The 
SoA is included in the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors and, as the Treaty specifies, it 
is taken into consideration by the European Parliament and the Council in the context of the 
discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the EU budget.7 Moreover, 
the ECA produces special reports which are generally associated with its other key mission, 
namely performance or value-for-money audit.8 Such audit is underpinned by the ‘three Es’, 
i.e. economy, efficiency and effectiveness.9 In addition, the Treaty states that the ECA provides 
an opinion on legislation pertaining to financial rules concerning the implementation of the EU 
budget and the prevention and fight against fraud.10 Despite its name, the ECA is not a judicial 
institution: its reports contain recommendations and it does not have legally enforceable 
powers. Even its findings in the SoA are not compulsory upon Parliament in its discharge 
decision (albeit, naturally, the SoA is being taken into due consideration by Parliament and the 
Council). And yet, mirroring the CJEU, its Members are assigned to five chambers,11 focusing 
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on different fields of audit, as well as to the horizontal Audit Quality Control Committee.12 
This is but a brief summary of the ECA’s main functions.13 
Such is the nature of the Court of Auditors’ work that a crucial, arguably the most important, 
precondition for success is independence. Independence is a broad notion effectively entailing 
that an institution should operate autonomously, without external influence and pressure. It is 
well known that non-majoritarian institutions ‘are not directly subject to political oversight or 
the popular vote’ and therefore the ‘key to their legitimacy lies in their independence and the 
importance of their role in fostering good government’.14 Different dimensions of 
independence have been presented in the ECJ’s case-law (including Advocate-General Jacobs’ 
distinction between institutional, personal and financial independence15) and in the literature.16 
The ECA has been described inter alia as the ‘financial conscience’ of the Union17 or as the 
‘guardian of the EU finances’.18 Thus, independence enables or should enable the ECA to work 
without political pressure, maximising its (expert) output. In addition, it is only natural that at 
times of financial instability EU citizens expect of the ECA to observe the highest standards of 
integrity and impartiality, while delivering products that will enable them to hold the EU 
institutions (and, in particular, the Commission, which has the overall responsibility for the 
implementation of the budget under Article 317 TFEU) and their member states to account. 
Relatedly, the EU budget is one of the key policy pillars underlined by the Commission’s White 
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Paper on the Future of Europe.19 Shortly after the publication of that Paper, the Commission 
published a specific reflection paper on the future of EU Finances,20 to which the ECA 
responded in February 2018.21 The Commission’s paper rightly points out that the EU value 
added should be at the core of the discussion on the future of the budget, and that ‘concerns 
and expectations of European citizens should be a major factor in shaping’ it.22 If the ECA is 
the ‘guardian of EU Finances’, it becomes clear why the question of its independence should 
be at the centre of the ongoing discussions on the future of the EU. 
In this context, the purpose of this article is to assess different aspects of the ECA’s formal 
independence. This notion should be clarified: a critical distinction relied upon in this 
contribution is the one between formal (or legal23) and de facto independence. The former 
refers to ‘the degree of independence from politics inherent in those legal instruments which 
constitute and govern’ the ECA, while the latter to actual, real life independence.24 Thus, while 
this article is not an empirical study on what actually happens on the ground (for example, the 
degree of independence of ECA staff when performing on the spot visits across member states), 
formal independence is indispensable for auditors. According to the Lima Declaration of the 
International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), which contains 
principles to which the ECA naturally subscribes, ‘the degree of … independence [of Supreme 
Audit Institutions] shall be laid down in the Constitution; details may be set out in legislation’.25 
This principle accentuates, therefore, the importance of formal independence. Related to this 
is the observation that if ‘these conditions of independence are defined in the treaty itself [then 
this] is a major guarantee of their respect’.26 In other words, member states and EU institutions 
are well aware that no less than treaty revision is required in order to reduce the scope of the 
ECA’s independence. Overall, therefore, it is recognised internationally that formal 
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independence is a prerequisite in order to insulate the auditors from external interference, 
without necessarily guaranteeing, of course, real-life independence. 
Although the present contribution focuses on the Court of Auditors, it seeks to contribute to 
the broader debate on the independence of supranational institutions in the EU, and in particular 
that of the Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Court of Justice. Many of 
the questions surrounding the ECA’s independence can be of relevance to the abovementioned 
institutions, which have, of course, different mandates and functions. That being said, the 
article generally does not seek to answer the question of the ECA’s accountability, which can 
indeed be seen as the other side of independence.27 However, the penultimate section will 
provide some remarks that pertain (also) to the ECA’s accountability.  
The article is structured as follows. The next section poses a pivotal question that informs the 
analysis throughout the piece: what is the key purpose of the ECA’s independence? The answer 
is that the primary constitutional justification behind such independence is the need to act on 
behalf of, and safeguard, the EU interest. The subsequent sections explore different aspects of 
the existing legal framework, namely the appointment and number of ECA Members, and the 
ECA’s independence in its functions (with separate sections focusing on the member states and 
the EU institutions). The penultimate section clarifies that independence should not be 
conflated with lack of accessibility. The concluding remarks summarise the discussion. 
2. Why should the ECA be independent? 
On this point, two potentially conflicting views exist, also within the Court of Auditors. On the 
one hand, some suggest that the ECA should be independent merely because it is an audit 
institution. Simply put: ‘since we are auditors, we are/ have to be independent’. On the other, 
it can equally be argued that the ECA should be independent because it should act on behalf 
of, and defend, the Union interest. This account submits that the Treaty and several further 
rules and sources confirm that the primary rationale behind independence is the need to act on 
behalf of the EU interest. Both positions will be examined in turn. It is noteworthy, in this 
respect, that personal (i.e. of the members) and institutional independence are interconnected 
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issues as the ‘independence of Supreme Audit Institutions is inseparably linked to the 
independence of its members’.28 
According to the first position, and further to entrenched views within the auditing profession, 
auditors’ independence is a state of mind, ‘characterised by integrity and an objective approach 
to professional work’.29 A key principle within the profession is the duty of ‘professional 
skepticism’, i.e. ‘an attitude that includes a questioning mind, being alert to conditions which 
may indicate possible misstatement due to error or fraud, and a critical assessment of audit 
evidence’.30 The above applies to the ECA as well: it is clearly an external audit institution, 
and its methodology, policies and standards do refer to internationally developed norms within 
the profession. Besides, through international cooperation, the ECA contributes to the 
development of these standards.31 However, it is essential to pose the question as to whether in 
the existing EU constitutional framework, the primary justification of granting the ECA the 
degree of independence it enjoys (examined in further detail below) is the function itself, i.e. 
auditing. A careful examination of provisions of primary law and other sources points in a 
different direction: the ECA’s independence should be viewed in the context of acting on behalf 
of, and defending, the EU interest. 
To begin with, Article 285 TFEU provides that the ECA’s Members ‘shall be completely 
independent in the performance of their duties, in the Union’s general interest’. A similar 
formulation is found in the Preamble to the ECA’s Code of Conduct.32 Importantly, the treaty 
can be interpreted to mean that the Members do not necessarily need to have a background in 
auditing. Thus, Article 286(1) TFEU stipulates that the ‘Members of the Court of Auditors 
shall be chosen from among persons who belong or have belonged in their respective States to 
external audit bodies or who are especially qualified for this office. Their independence must 
be beyond doubt’. As will be seen below, an ongoing debate takes place within the European 
Parliament (but also within the Court of Auditors itself) as to whether this provision was wisely 
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drafted. A comparison with the respective provision concerning the judges of the Court is 
revealing: according to Article 253 TFEU, a juridical background is essential.33  
Some historical background is also useful here. When the first Members of the ECA undertook 
their solemn oath in 1977, the then President of the ECJ opined that the work of the Court of 
Auditors should be placed in the same framework surrounding the work of  the ECJ and the 
Commission, and it is in this context that its independence should be viewed.34 Thus, although 
some might consider that such independence is ‘self-evident’, the respective provisions 
underlie that ‘above the member states there exists a European Community which is authorized 
and called upon to act independently … Accordingly, the Treaties refer to the “general interest 
of the Community” which we are bound to serve in the performance of our duties’.35 
To be sure, both notions (independence stemming from the auditing profession, and 
independence to defend the Union interest) are contested. On the one hand, it cannot be claimed 
that the regulation of the auditing profession is harmonised across Europe, nor that it has 
developed a concrete set of professional standards (including procedures and methodologies) 
to which all auditors subscribe. This is partly due to the divergent auditing traditions across 
member states, as will be shown below. True, the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) subscribe 
to declarations drafted by international bodies (such as the Lima Declaration) but these 
documents use, understandably, vaguely drafted formulations and principles which are not 
legally enforceable. On the other, the notion of EU interest, albeit not having received the 
deserved scholarly attention, cannot be taken for granted either. The notion is frequently 
examined with regard to the Commission’s role to ‘promote the general interest of the Union’.36 
On this point, commentators have queried, for example, whether the Commission always 
represents the Union interest when initiating legislation,37 the extent to which the socialisation 
within the Commission leads to support for international norms,38 or the possible impact of 
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comitology39 – among others. Accordingly, it is not a foregone conclusion that the EU interest 
as a term can be conceptualised homogeneously or has the same implications for all the 
supranational institutions. The aforementioned degree of uncertainty about the precise contours 
of the notions suggests that these choices are neither one-dimensional nor mutually exclusive. 
Consequently, the article submits that the primary justification regarding the ECA’s 
independence is the need to defend the EU interest. Moreover, it is remembered that the present 
article is concerned with the ECA’s formal independence, i.e. the applicable legal framework; 
and the above analysis has shown in which direction that framework mainly points.  
Framing the ECA’s independence in the context of the need to safeguard the EU interest is not 
a purely theoretical issue but has a number of implications: subsequent sections will examine 
the criteria and process of appointment for the ECA Members, as well as the overall number 
of Members as such, through the prism of this dichotomy. The prioritisation of the EU interest 
over the status of auditor as such also pertains to certain aspects of the ECA’s relations with 
member states and EU institutions. Significant choices of constitutional and institutional 
design, therefore, depend on where precisely the emphasis should be placed. More generally, 
the supranational character of the institution effectively entails refraining from defending the 
interests of member states, and especially that of the respective country of the Member. 
Moreover, and with the necessary reminder that the earlier remarks should not be viewed as 
inviting the ECA to depart from widely recognised standards and principles within the auditing 
profession, the possibility that the latter might one day be faced with developments in the 
profession which, if followed, cannot automatically be deemed to serve the EU interest, cannot 
be ruled out. Obviously, the ECA would have to resist subscribing to such developments, and 
an appropriate constitutional justification is its mission to safeguard the EU interest.  
Even though one might be excused for thinking that Article 286 TFEU may result in losses in 
expertise (or, indeed, independence), there are benefits, too: the ‘presence of politicians, which 
at times created problems with those who came from a professional auditing background, has 
actually assisted the Court to chart the difficult waters of interinstitutional relations’.40 Thus, 
to return to Article 286(1) TFEU, an appropriate constitutional justification behind this 
diversity (in terms of Members’ background) is the need to safeguard the EU interest, and it is 
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through this lens that the term especially qualified may be understood. To be sure, the 
authoritative interpretation of this rather ambiguous term can only be provided by the ECJ, if 
such opportunity arises; yet in the author’s view, as currently drafted, and if contrasted with 
Article 253 TFEU, this provision may not be interpreted to mean that the ECA Members should 
stem exclusively from the auditing profession. This is not, of course, to suggest that the ECA 
should be interfering with political decision-making as this would, indeed, undermine its 
independence. Ultimately, this question is inextricably linked, in the first instance, with the 
criteria and procedure behind the appointment of the ECA Members, which is examined below. 
3. The appointment of the ECA Members 
The appointment of the ECA Members is regulated by the Treaty, while the process has 
remained unchanged since 1977, despite several legitimate calls by the European Parliament 
(and especially the Budgetary Control Committee) to undertake a more substantial role therein. 
In this context, Article 286(2) TFEU provides, firstly, that the Members are appointed for a 
renewable term of six years and, secondly, that the ‘Council, after consulting the European 
Parliament, shall adopt the list of Members drawn up in accordance with the proposals made 
by each Member State’. From this it follows that the European Parliament does not have a right 
of consent, either for individual Members or for the ECA College as a whole (as is the case 
with the Commission under Article 17(7) TEU).41 It is well known that the European 
Parliament has relied on this particular power to scrutinise and effectively replace unsuitable 
candidates for the Commission that were nominated by member states. The procedure under 
Article 286(2) TFEU also entails the absence of a panel similar to the one under Article 255 
TFEU for the judges of the Court - a panel which, on balance, is perceived to have contributed 
towards limiting the arbitrariness of certain national selection processes.42  
Since the establishment of the ECA in 1977, the European Parliament has consistently reported 
instances of delayed submissions of candidacies, or even appointments despite a clear negative 
opinion by the Budgetary Committee and/ or the plenary.  In 1983, for example, and in the 
context of nominations which were approved by Parliament, the Budgetary Committee 
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‘deplore[d] the fact that Parliament had relatively little time to deliberate’.43 In 1989, because 
of the belated submission of the dossiers, Parliament declared itself incompetent to provide an 
opinion before the expiration of the Members’ respective mandates.44 After the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which elevated the ECA to an institution, Parliament seized the opportunity to 
contextualise the nomination process, and pose inter alia the following question: should the 
ECA Members be considered as public auditors or politicians?45 
‘If they are to be considered as politicians then their nomination by their national 
governments is the proper procedure; in which case, however, the Court of Auditors 
cannot be considered as the Community’s public auditor but as the forum where national 
governments discuss and settle the problems of the Community’s finances in a political 
way. This is clearly not what the Treaties provide.’46 
The ideal way forward, according to Parliament, was to change the unanimity rule in the 
Council and to grant Parliament a right of assent. The Treaty of Nice changed the unanimity 
rule to qualified majority.47 In practice, member states within the Council generally do not 
object to the nominee proposed by the respective government. 
Perhaps the most substantial contribution by Parliament to the appointment method was 
provided in a 2014 resolution on the future role of the Court of Auditors.48 Therein, Parliament 
(relying also on earlier resolutions adopted in the nineties) reiterated that ‘some appointments 
have given rise to differences of opinion between Parliament and the Council, the persistence 
of which risks harming the good working relations of the Court with the aforementioned 
institutions and, possibly, having serious negative consequences for the credibility, and hence 
the effectiveness, of the Court’.49 Parliament effectively suggested that when a candidate’s 
weaknesses during the hearing are exposed, yet this is ultimately ignored by the Council (given 
that the Parliament does not have the power to block the appointment), the credibility of this 
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particular Member, once assuming office, is obviously undermined. Moreover, when the 
Council appoints Members in the simultaneous ‘unfavourable’ opinion by Parliament, this is 
‘incomprehensible and shows a lack of respect for Parliament’.50 Drawing a comparison with 
the nominees for the Court of Justice, Parliament criticised the Council effectively for applying 
double standards, since it has always followed (and without an explicit Treaty obligation) the 
recommendations of the Article 255 TFEU panel.51 
Parliament then went on to outline its vision and criteria for the selection of suitable candidates 
for the Court of Auditors. It proposed a number of criteria, including the following: high level 
professional experience in public finance, auditing and management; good auditing record and 
command of at least one of the working languages of the EU; on the date of appointment, the 
absence of holding any political office; the age of candidates with an expectation that on the 
date of appointment candidates may not be over 67; high standards of integrity and morality; 
the need to respect gender balance should be taken very seriously, in that the Council should 
propose at least two candidates from each member state, one being a woman and one being a 
man.52 Moreover, the Council should provide all the necessary details concerning the career 
background of nominees and proactively cooperate with the respective national authority with 
a view to communicating Parliament’s criteria.53 
Parliament’s criteria are a more elaborate version of earlier resolutions alerting the Council to 
similar issues.54 On this basis, it emerges that Parliament’s preference is for candidates (and 
therefore Members) to have a background in auditing. This is not a stance to be criticised as 
Parliament’s aim is to ensure expertise in light of the nature of the tasks involved and, equally 
important, insulation from the respective domestic political arena. On the other hand, the 
appointment process cannot be dissociated from the main constitutional platform upon which 
independence should be based, namely the need to act on behalf of the EU interest. Seen 
through this lens, it cannot be excluded that Members who might not necessarily have a 
background in auditing could contribute to the fulfilment of the ECA’s core mission. 
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Conversely, it is not automatically certain that an excellent auditor in one specific member state 
will adapt themselves to the collegiate, EU-wide nature of the ECA’s role. And indeed, the 
ECA has been a diverse college which has included, among others, politicians,55 academics or 
lawyers.56  
In any event, in order for the European Parliament to have a meaningful role in the process, a 
revision of Article 286(2) TFEU is required in order to grant the European Parliament a right 
of consent. This has been an ongoing request by Parliament effectively since the establishment 
of the ECA, and it is only through this revision that the aforementioned delays, 
miscommunication and, in remote cases, failure to comply with Parliament’s negative opinion, 
can be dealt with. The experience with the hearings of the nominated Commissioners confirms 
as much. If such amendment takes place, it will then be left to the European Parliament and, in 
particular, the Budgetary Control Committee, to determine the suitability of the proposed 
candidates by the Council, taking into account the supranational character of this EU institution 
and the corresponding mission to protect the EU interest. If the Committee concluded that only 
esteemed auditors would pass this threshold, then so be it. It is only through meticulous scrutiny 
by Parliament and application of specific criteria (such as the ones that have already been 
prepared) in the selection that the possibilities of complete independence from member states 
can be maximised.  
It may be asked whether there is scope to replace the existing appointment scheme with a panel 
inspired by Article 255 TFEU; if such panel were to be established, this would probably move 
the ECA towards a clearer technocratic direction. Yet that option would raise several 
challenges: Parliament is central to the discharge procedure, and therefore it has legitimate 
interests to be involved in the ECA’s appointment procedure. In addition, and relatedly, an 
expert panel similar to the one for the CJEU would nullify the persistent ‘fight’ (for several 
decades) of the European Parliament to have a more meaningful role in that process; lastly, 
such proposal would probably find very limited support by both Parliament and the Council. 
4. The number of ECA Members 
 
55
 Who have worked on establishing inter-institutional relations; see Laffan (n 1) 255. 
56
 Whose expertise may be employed for strategic decisions concerning legal powers entrusted upon the ECA 
under the Treaty, and most notably the faculty of the ECA to bring an action for annulment under Article 263(3) 
TFEU in order to protect its prerogatives. 
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The number of ECA Members also pertains to formal independence as this is, of course, a 
matter regulated directly by the Treaty, which provides that the ECA should be composed of 
one national per member state.57 However, and especially post-Maastricht, several claims have 
been advanced that the number of the ECA Members should be reduced. The main argument 
is the need to increase the ECA’s effectiveness in audit, to attribute a more technocratic 
character to its work, and therefore to insulate it from any political pressure. Effectiveness was 
the key argument in Parliament’s 1994 report on the independence of the Community 
institutions.58 In the earlier Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union the UK 
delegation had submitted a proposal to redesign an ECA of twelve Members, assisted by a 
Board of Management.59 The UK continued to push for a more flexible ECA via a report 
published in 2001 by the House of Lords European Union Committee. Therein, the House of 
Lords concluded that in light of the enlargement, an ECA of ‘over 20 full-time executive 
members would be unwieldy, sluggish and ineffective’.60 This time, that Committee proposed 
‘the impartial appointment of a highly-qualified chief executive, supported by a large team of 
audit staff, reporting to a part-time, non-executive board of representatives from each of the 
Member States’ (in order to maintain national representation as well).61 Claims advancing the 
ECA’s professionalisation with a clear focus on the auditing profession, replacing the principle 
of geographical representation, have also been advanced more recently.62 Such proposals bring 
to the fore the aforementioned potential tensions between (partly) divergent visions of 
independence: that one rooted in the auditing profession, and the defence of the EU interest. 
While there is certainly merit to these arguments (after all, some of these proposals have been 
advanced by former Members of the ECA), this does not necessary mean that the ECA itself 
as an institution has endorsed this amendment of the legal framework. In 1991, in a letter 
addressed to the remaining Members of the ECA, the (then) President opined that a pyramid 
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 See Art. 285 TFEU. 
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 Explanatory statement (n 45) point 28. 
59
 ‘Note from the United Kingdom delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, CONF-
UP 1737/91’ (1991) pp. 7-8. 
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 House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, 12th report, ‘The European Court of Auditors: The Case 
for Reform’ (2001) Summary of conclusions, point 6. 
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62
 See, for example, Jules Muis, ‘The mandate of the European Court of Auditors re-examined’ in Committee on 
Budgetary Control, Public Hearing: Future role of the European Court of Auditors: Challenges ahead and 
possible reform (2012) p. 68. Muis is a former Internal Auditor of the Commission, and proposed a scheme with 
a Chair or President and a number of Directors. See also Jan Karlsson, ‘Interview: Towards a European Council 
of Audit?’ Journal Cour des comptes européen 7/2012, p. 5-6. Karlsson is a former ECA President, and proposed 
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per country. 
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structure with an executive director would conflate the responsibilities and could lead to exactly 
opposite results (than the intended efficacy).63 Moreover, in 2000 the ECA firmly objected to 
a reduction in the number of Members, and this despite the forthcoming enlargement of the 
Union.64 The arguments that were advanced merit particular attention: ‘any change to this rule 
might trigger negative reactions among Member States afraid of ceasing to be “represented” at 
Court level and, inevitably, could trigger political negotiations seeking to compensate for this 
in other institutions or, even, within the institution itself’. Furthermore, and drawing an analogy 
with the CJEU, the ECA submitted that the representation of each ‘national financial 
framework’ enables the auditing of Community finances to benefit from each audit and 
financial tradition, lends legitimacy to the ECA’s work, and augments the commitment of 
national audit institutions to the ‘objectives and application of Community controls’.65 That 
would be even more necessary in light of the forthcoming enlargement of the Union. These 
arguments found support at the time within the European Parliament.66 In fact, it appears that 
the chamber structure, inspired by the Court of Justice and eventually implemented in 2004 
(previously the ECA worked under ‘audit groups’), was a creative way to propose gains in 
efficiency while maintaining the ‘one Member per state’ rule.67  
In this context, the aforementioned arguments advanced by the ECA cannot be rejected 
outright, and perhaps most importantly the point about the varying auditing traditions across 
Europe, particularly because the ECA (and therefore its Members, too) need to coordinate visits 
at the member states and be in contact with domestic Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs). More 
fundamentally, in the author’s view the case has not been made as to why the ECA should be 
‘more independent’ than other supranational institutions, and primarily the Court of Justice,68 
which is also composed of one judge per member state69 (although a comparison with the 
Commission70 may not be entirely inappropriate, too). To return to the Court of Auditors, such 
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 See ‘Révision des traités’, CCE INF. 1991 47/91. 
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 See ‘Draft contribution from the European Court of Auditors to the Intergovernmental Conference, Annex I’ 
(2000)  
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 Ibid, point 1.1. 
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 Ibid, Annex III. 
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 Ibid, and also Draft contribution, Annex I (above n 64). 
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 It is noted, in this respect, that the latest reform of the Court as an institution eventually led to a solution that 
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Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 
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proposals essentially seek to attribute the technocratic character and degree of independence of 
the ECB. Contrary to the ECB however, which has a clear mandate to prioritise price stability, 
the Treaty is silent as to how the ECA will perform its audit functions (this point is returned to 
below). One could also argue that, while the Treaty guarantees the independence of national 
central banks,71 there is no reference to the independence of SAIs. One cannot therefore draw 
direct comparisons between monetary policy in the EU and external audit. 
Thus, it is submitted that other proposals should be explored (and exhausted) first before 
resorting to a more radical amendment of the ECA’s formal independence with regard to the 
number of Members, which, in any event, is unlikely to find support in light of the almost 
certain reactions by member states. Again, the focus should be on the appointment process, 
rather than the number of Members. By granting a stronger role to the European Parliament (as 
the earlier section argued), it may simultaneously be possible to achieve most of the aims 
advanced by the proponents of a smaller ECA. 
5. Independence in the ECA’s functions: General remarks 
The legal framework concerning the ECA’s independence in its functions is rather robust. To 
begin with the Treaty text, Article 286(3) TFEU stipulates that the ECA Members in ‘the 
performance of [their] duties … shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government 
or from any other body’ and ‘refrain from any action incompatible with their duties’. The 
subsequent paragraph adds that during their term of office, the Members should not ‘engage in 
any other occupation, whether gainful or not’, and that when assuming office ‘they shall give 
a solemn undertaking that, both during and after their term of office, they will respect the 
obligations arising therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion 
as regards the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or 
benefits’.72 Only the Court of Justice can remove an ECA Member from office when finding 
that she or he no longer fulfils the requirements; otherwise, the security of the post is guaranteed 
by the Treaty, which provides that the term ends only by death, resignation and normal 
 
European Commission [2013] OJ L 165/98. As is known, that decision was adopted to accommodate Irish 
concerns with respect to the Lisbon Treaty. 
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 Art. 130 TFEU. 
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 See Art. 286(4) TFEU. 
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replacement.73 The privileges and immunities applicable to the CJEU judges also apply to the 
ECA Members.74 
The ECA’s Rules of Procedure, which require the approval of the Council under Article 287(4) 
TFEU, are silent on the concept of independence, merely referring to the aforementioned 
Treaty provisions.75 By contrast, the ECA’s Implementing rules,76 which are adopted by the 
ECA alone, elaborate on what independence means in the performance of the Members’ duties. 
The first Implementing rules were adopted by the Court of Auditors in 2004, and were followed 
by several amendments. Criteria have been established therein to facilitate the assessment as 
to whether the independence standards are met.77 Importantly, reporting obligations have been 
imposed upon the Members to notify outside activities to the President of the Court of Auditors; 
these are assessed by an Ethics Committee established for this purpose.78 Similar obligations 
apply to former Members within the first year after leaving the office.79 
Implementing a recommendation by the first international peer review of the ECA’s work,80 
and mirroring international developments in audit,81 the ECA adopted a Code of Conduct for 
its Members,82 which contains additional ethical rules with a view to insulating them from 
potential conflict of interest. The Code elaborates on the principles of independence (the first 
article in the Code),83 impartiality (in particular avoiding conflict of interest),84 integrity,85 and 
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 Art. 286(8) TFEU. 
75
 See Article 3 of Rules of Procedure of the Court of Auditors of the European Union [2010] OJ L 103/1 
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 Decision No 38/2016 laying down the rules for implementing the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Auditors, 
available at: 
www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/IMPLEMENTING_RULES_2016/IMPLEMENTING_RULES_2016
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commitment.86 The publication of the Members’ declarations of interest is an important step in 
this direction.87 The Code assigns monitoring tasks to the President and, further to the 
corresponding Implementing rules, decision-making and interpretative responsibilities 
regarding outside activities and (more generally) any other ethical considerations to the Ethics 
Committee.88 Contrary to the INTOSAI Code, the ECA Code does not refer to competence, 
despite the recognised need for auditors to be not only independent, but also ‘competent’.89 
Here again, the possibility of divergent professional backgrounds of Members in the Treaties 
is of relevance – a matter linked with the dual rationale (auditing profession and EU interest) 
for independence that was discussed above. 
Overall, therefore, the legal framework concerning the degree of ECA’s independence in the 
performance of its duties is robust. The Treaty contains sufficient guarantees, which are 
crystallised in the Implementing rules and the Code of Conduct. The presence of an Ethics 
Committee is certainly a step towards further transparency and ethical governance. It should 
be noted that the more elaborate conditions for independence were drafted by the Court of 
Auditors itself, either via the Implementing rules or the Code, without the participation of the 
Council. In other words, the fact that the Rules of Procedure (requiring the Council’s approval) 
are effectively silent on this question gives latitude to the Court of Auditors to adjust these 
standards and respond to challenges and recommendations from the public auditing world. 
Differently put, it is further confirmation in itself of the ECA’s independence. After all, this 
practice corresponds to international standards pointing to the discretion of SAIs in the 
performance of their work: and in any event, the ECA itself is in a better position to identify 
what could possibly be a threat for its smooth operation. On the other hand, it should equally 
be acknowledged that the latitude the ECA (plausibly) enjoys to draft the more precise 
 
86
 Art. 4 of the Code. This principle mainly refers to absence of engagement with a political office or outside 
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conditions for independence brings to the fore the tension between independence and other 
interests, and notably accountability and scrutiny. 
Having discussed the legal framework concerning the ECA’s functions in more general terms, 
it is now appropriate to examine separately the ECA’s independence from the member states, 
before moving on to the EU institutions.  
6. Independence from member states 
The earlier discussion on the appointment procedure is of direct relevance to the ECA’s 
independence from member states. Leaving this issue aside, this section will inquire into the 
independence from member states once the Members have assumed office. It will be seen, 
however, that this question cannot be insulated from the broader budgetary arrangements in the 
EU. Even though the Commission formally assumes responsibility for the implementation of 
the EU budget under Article 317 TFEU,90 approximately 80% of the EU budget falls under 
shared management, whereby the Commission assumes a monitoring role but effectively funds 
are distributed and expenditure is managed by the member states. And it falls upon the ECA to 
provide an opinion also regarding the implementation of the budget at the domestic level: this 
is the ECA’s most challenging task. 
The ECA cannot but work with the national authorities and/or the SAIs of the member states. 
To that end, the Treaty grants the ECA significant powers which pertain to the domestic level. 
The Members perform on the spot checks in the member states, ‘including on the premises of 
any natural or legal person in receipt of payments from the budget’.91 The ECJ’s case-law has 
clarified that member states are normally not expected to object to such audit visits.92 Further, 
the Treaty provides that in the member states ‘the audit shall be carried out in liaison with 
national audit bodies or, if these do not have the necessary powers, with the competent national 
departments. The Court of Auditors and the national audit bodies of the Member States shall 
cooperate in a spirit of trust while maintaining their independence.’93 According to the same 
provision, ‘[t]hese bodies or departments shall inform the Court of Auditors whether they 
 
90
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intend to take part in the audit’. The fact that the domestic authority is notified, but not obliged, 
to take part in the audit ‘confirms the autonomous nature of the Court [of Auditors]’s audit 
rights in the member states’94 as the audit will be carried out regardless of the presence or even 
consent of the national audit office. Any document or information ‘necessary to carry out its 
task’ shall be forwarded to the ECA by other EU institutions, ‘any natural or legal person in 
receipt of payments from the budget, and the national audit bodies or, if these do not have the 
necessary powers, the competent national departments’.95  
The clause referring to a ‘spirit of trust’ between the ECA and the national authorities did not 
feature in the Budgetary Treaty of 1975 (establishing the Court of Auditors) but was only added 
in the Amsterdam Treaty. A historical examination of the initial tensions between the ECA and 
certain SAIs or other domestic authorities can explain the rationale behind this welcome 
addition. In 1978, for example, the ECA had to underline its ‘very extensive’ investigatory 
powers under the Treaty, which ‘should be given wide interpretation’.96 The ECA added that 
the meaning of the term ‘liaison’ in what is now Article 287(3) TFEU ‘is to enable the national 
audit bodies to take part in the audits, and cannot be interpreted as the gateway to the [ECA’s] 
operation in the member states’.97 In 1981, the French Court of Auditors required clarifications 
as to how on-the-spot visits would be conducted, insisting that a member of the French Court 
or another official be present (something that the Treaty clearly permits). However, the 
proposal to include in the ECA’s reports replies and observations by national SAIs was found 
impractical.98 Similar exchanges took place at the time with the UK Parliamentary Committee 
on Public Accounts.99 Realising that it would come across different types of national bodies in 
receipt of funds from the EU budget, as well as different kinds of questions unravelled during 
the audit,100 the ECA was quick to arrange several meetings with national liaison officers, 
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which included fruitful discussions as to how the ECA should coordinate in a more effective 
way its approach regarding member states visits.101  
More generally, the ECA is a member of the Contact Committee of the Supreme Audit 
Institutions of the European Union, an ‘informal’ and ‘non-hierarchical’ form of governance102 
whose aim is to foster collaboration between the national and the European external audit 
institutions.103 The ECA took advantage of this informal setting to exchange views on several 
items of mutual concern, such as the supply of information, the contradictory procedure, access 
to private recipients of grants, among others.104 However fruitful the relations with most SAIs 
might have become, the fact that the ECA does need to provide an assessment of the 
implementation of the budget at the domestic level prompts a number of difficult questions.  
To begin with, should the ECA be ‘naming and shaming’ member states if they underperform, 
or given that the Commission is the main auditee, criticisms vis-à-vis the member states must 
be limited? In the absence of any guidance from the Treaties as to how its reports should be 
presented, the ECA has generally decided to do the latter. An empirical study for the years 
1996-2001 found that the ECA preferred to refer to the member states as a whole, and even 
more so in the SoA part of the Annual Report, where references to individual member states 
were very infrequent.105 Besides, and faced with the impossibility to trace every transaction at 
the domestic level, the ECA opted for a ‘systems-based approach’ to auditing. This assumes is 
‘that every organization must create its own internal control mechanism, and that external 
auditors can – to a certain extent – rely on these internal controls’.106 The ECA tests this model 
via a sample of transactions107 with a view to ‘presenting to the discharge authority 
observations on significant shortcomings and thus giving a “true and fair” view of the use’ of 
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EU funds.108 Accordingly, the ECA has pushed for and developed principles for a ‘single audit’ 
model, with the Commission situated on the top of the pyramid.109  
Thus, much of the discussion concerning the implementation of the budget and, consequently, 
the ECA’s supervision of such implementation, has centred on the member states. It has been 
argued that the Commission’s view is that its budgetary responsibilities exceed its executive 
powers, in that they ‘leave off where those of the member states start’.110 And in reality, it is 
indeed difficult to impose guidelines of best practice ‘from Brussels’ to thousands of national 
entities which are not ‘subordinated to the Commission’.111 This renders the ECA’s work 
somewhat challenging, and the same applies to the European Parliament’s discharge decision 
as the latter cannot question and hold to account national administrations.112  
In light of these challenges, the way forward for some113 (and even more so for the European 
Parliament114) is for SAIs to adopt a national declaration for EU funds, along the lines of the 
SoA model. This proposal does not, however, come without difficulties. The ECA itself has 
acknowledged that the scheme represents a ‘voluntary initiative’115 by member states, unless a 
Treaty modification occurs whereby the existing loose form of cooperation would be revisited 
(except for the ECA’s significant investigatory powers at the national level, as already noted). 
Importantly, they are addressed to national parliaments and whether they ‘provide useful 
additional information will depend on the scope and quality of the work that underlies them’.116 
Simply put, the ECA’s Opinion underlined the divergent mandates, as well as the varying 
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quality of work of domestic SAIs, and called for a harmonisation of standards (at the very least) 
in order for this proposal to be further discussed. Albeit not featuring prominently in the 
Opinion, another methodological concern was that ‘[t]he “national” nature of the national 
declarations and national audit work contrasts with the current horizontal nature of the Court’s 
work where conclusions are generally provided by budgetary area rather than individual 
member state’.117 This point is also linked to the aforementioned tendency of the ECA to 
generally avoid ‘naming and shaming’ member states. 
Others believe that far-reaching solutions are necessary in order to deal with this difficult 
equation, i.e. the conditions surrounding the implementation and audit of the budget: the formal 
responsibility of the Commission, the ECA’s broad mandate in the absence of limitless 
resources, and the fact that at least 80% of the EU budget is effectively managed by member 
states. Thus, Cipriani argues that the Commission should take full responsibility for the 
implementation of the budget, by delegating specific executive tasks to national authorities. 
Funds should be allocated further to an ‘accreditation process’, which would entail a shift from 
the current ex post to an ex ante logic in the implementation.118 He effectively argues for an 
allocation based on good performance and measurable outputs of EU added-value that would 
replace the present system of ‘eligible spending’.119 This is a matter echoed in the ECA’s 2018 
paper on the future of EU finances as well, where it is suggested inter alia that a common, 
inter-institutionally agreed, definition of ‘EU added value’ is needed.120 Groenendijk argues 
for a more meaningful ‘integration of internal and external budgetary control’.121  
While a complete re-design of the EU system of implementation of the budget is a matter that 
goes beyond the ECA’s influence, the latter can improve, to a certain extent, the legal 
framework pertaining to Members’ independence from member states in the performance of 
their functions. More specifically, as Desmoulin observed, Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Implementing rules grant information rights to Members concerning audits related to their 
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countries.122 Thus, Article 2 of the Implementing rules states that ‘[t]he Member acting as 
Reporting Member shall forward a copy, which may be in electronic form, of all 
correspondence with the national authorities being audited and the national audit institution 
concerned to the Member of the Court who has the same nationality as those bodies’. 
Accordingly, Article 3 stipulates that ‘[i]f Members agree to be interviewed by the media of 
any State other than their own, they may first consult the Member who has the nationality of 
the State concerned’.123 These provisions sit uncomfortably with the duty of ECA Members to 
act on behalf of the EU interest once they assume office. Since the Implementing rules are the 
sole responsibility of the ECA, it is submitted that the usefulness of maintaining these 
provisions should be reflected upon.  
7. Independence from the EU institutions 
As the external auditor in the EU, the ECA must, of course, remain independent also from the 
EU institutions. Simultaneously, it needs to develop good working relations, particularly with 
the Commission, which is the main auditee, but also with other EU institutions and bodies, and 
notably the European Parliament and the Council, which are responsible for the discharge of 
the Commission.124 Considering the ECA’s early years of operation, Laffan observed that it 
‘had extremely conflictual relations with the Commission125 and the European Investment 
Bank, was largely ignored by the Council of Ministers126 and the European Council, and was 
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welcomed as a supporter by the European Parliament’.127 With regard to the Commission, the 
institution formally responsible for the implementation of the EU budget unsurprisingly felt 
discomfort when subjected to a newly established mechanism of administrative, financial 
accountability.128 Concerning the Council, and leaving aside the appointment procedure, the 
Council’s continued indifference vis-à-vis the ECA after the successful appointment of 
nominees129 is certainly unfortunate from the point of view of thorough monitoring of the 
Commission’s implementation of the budget. Nonetheless, it is a matter that does not require 
any further discussion from the point of view of the ECA’s formal independence.  
Yet, it is worth considering the inter-institutional relations between the ECA and the European 
Parliament. The Treaty provides that the ECA ‘shall assist the European Parliament and the 
Council in exercising their powers of control over the implementation of the budget’.130 Post-
Maastricht, the most important dimension of such assistance is Parliament’s consideration of 
the SoA which, according to Article 319(1) TFEU, should be taken into account by Parliament 
(and the Council, which provides a recommendation) before deciding on the discharge. The 
same applies to the ECA’s Annual Report (which does include the SoA for the respective 
financial year) and any relevant special reports. The SoA enabled Parliament to form a ‘global 
judgement’ of the Commission’s work, but also pushed the ECA to adopt a more coherent and 
professional audit approach, while increasing the ECA’s visibility and generating fresh 
attention to its outputs.131 
In the early years of the ECA’s operation (and therefore before the introduction of the SoA), 
Parliament would commend the ECA on the high standards of the – ‘indispensable’ for the 
discharge process - Annual Reports and, more generally, on ‘match[ing] very closely the 
expectations and concerns of parliamentary control’.132 However, Parliament later on raised its 
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expectations vis-à-vis the ECA. Thus, in its 1994 report on the independence of the Community 
institutions, Parliament observed, among others, that the ECA had ‘not always been successful 
in the fulfilment of [its] obligations’. Reflecting on the ECA’s record, it noted that in 1985 and 
1986 and concerning the Community revenue the ECA ‘was “unable to discharge its 
responsibilities in full” to audit the exact Community revenue’ in light of certain member 
states’ resistance to provide statistics or refusal to audit checks; the ECA had to assume a ‘small 
part of the blame’, Parliament observed, since it proved unable to ‘press the issue’ because of 
‘internal problems and political considerations’.133 Accordingly, concerning the Community 
expenditure, the ECA also demonstrated ‘serious weaknesses’ as ‘in certain areas its reports 
[were] rather superficial containing both good and bad quality auditing’, whereas it was 
criticised for being ‘less diligent’ vis-à-vis the European Parliament.134 That being said, the 
report acknowledged that, to the ECA’s credit, ‘in many cases the reports clearly pointed out 
the irregularities and responsibilities both of the Commission and the member states’.135 It was 
also added that the ECA had faced ‘a series of internal problems concerning its staff and 
allegations of over-spending’ which damaged its ‘outside image and credibility’.136 
Such considerably more critical approach was reiterated in the more recent resolution on the 
future role of the ECA, including the appointment process (a matter discussed above). Therein, 
Parliament firstly underlined that it was regrettable that the ECA’s results did not permit it to 
provide in the SoA a positive assessment of the legality and regularity of transactions for 
eighteen consecutive years, and added that since the SoA is ‘an annual indicator of a 
multiannual spending scheme’, it would have been preferable if the ECA could provide 
Parliament ‘with a midterm review and a summary report in addition to the annual’ SoA.137 
Importantly, the ECA was invited to pay more attention (and improve the quality) of 
performance, value-for-money audit, which falls outside the SoA exercise, but within 
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Parliament’s responsibility to provide a global assessment of the Commission’s 
implementation of the budget via the discharge process.138  
Some of the claims in the resolution merit closer examination. First, Parliament proposed for 
itself a follow-up process on earlier recommendations of the Court of Auditors, in order to 
motivate the Commission and the member states; simultaneously, ‘Parliament should also 
indicate to which major follow-up actions the Court can pay special attention in its annual 
report, without prejudice to its independence’.139 Second, it criticised the ECA for not 
‘collect[ing] in a structured way nor fully treat[ing] as preferential’ audit requests, and in 
particular those stemming from the European Parliament. Parliament ‘consider[ed] this to be 
detrimental to the relevance and impact of the Court’s audit results’ and ‘note[d] … that the 
added value of the Court is directly linked to the use made of its work by Parliament and other 
stakeholders in the accountability process’.140 This stance may partly be explained with 
reference to the historical background behind the ECA’s establishment. As already mentioned, 
while Aigner (later on the chair of Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control) was 
influential in convincing the EU institutions and the member states to create an external audit 
body with important powers, his vision was that the ECA could be ‘a sort of budgetary control 
arm of the Parliament’.141 Others have even suggested that Parliament developed a 
‘proprietorial’, ‘subordinate attitude’ vis-à-vis the ECA.142 For Sanchez Barrueco, the 
Budgetary Control Committee does not act as the liaison between Parliament and the Court of 
Auditors, but rather as ‘a kind of firewall’ between the two institutions, preventing the ECA 
from cooperating with committees whose field is more closely associated with particular audit 
tasks or products.143 Moreover, it has been observed that Parliament has used the notion of the 
ECA’s independence, as manifested in objective, expert opinions, to strengthen its position vis-
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à-vis the Council and the Commission.144 Yet simultaneously, Parliament ‘does not advocate 
the independence of the ECA at the expense of its control over the ECA’.145 
Against this background, it is submitted that the Treaty reasonably expects the Court of 
Auditors to assist the two institutions responsible for the discharge of the Commission and, in 
particular, the European Parliament, which has the final say in the process. The higher 
standards imposed upon the Court of Auditors after Maastricht, and in light of the SoA, have 
certainly enabled the ECA to improve its methodology and align its standards with international 
developments. However, the existing legal framework suggests that the ECA should also be 
independent from Parliament. Thus, it is not entirely clear why the ECA should be prioritising 
audit requests by Parliament or be fully responsive to its priorities via a follow-up process. 
There is a fine line between fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation and loss of 
independence. In addition, the more the ECA aligns itself with the views of the European 
Parliament, the easier it becomes for it to be accused of interference with political decision-
making (and hence lack of autonomy in the performance of its functions). It is therefore 
submitted that the ECA has reasonably resisted so far to accommodate certain of the 
parliamentary requests, to the extent that those would effectively result in the ECA becoming 
an organ of the European Parliament. Of course, continuous collaboration with the institution 
responsible for political accountability, insofar as it does not amount to preferential treatment, 
can only be beneficial for EU citizens and ultimately maximise the usability of the ECA’s 
outputs. And it is that – no doubt – delicate balance that arguably corresponds to a combined 
reading of, on the one hand, Article 286 and, on the other, Articles 287(4) and 319(1) TFEU. 
8. On independence and accessibility 
The penultimate section will pose the question as of whether the ECA is (or has been) open 
regarding its methodology and procedures, and to what extent its findings are communicated 
to the public in an effective and understandable way. On this latter point, a key priority in the 
auditing world is ‘the need for auditors … to open up their world as much as possible and 
enable more insight to be provided of auditors’ day-to-day working environments’.146 
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Accordingly, in financial regulation public engagement is one of the key strategies to ‘mediate 
the tension between independence and accountability while maintaining a focus on efficacy’.147 
The above remarks are clearly relevant to the work of the Court of Auditors. As is known, the 
financial crisis has brought to the fore questions of financial accountability and sound 
management of the EU budget. In addition, the ECA must be aware that its findings have been 
used by various Eurosceptic fora in order to criticise or even attack the EU and accuse it of 
various wrongdoings. The debate prior to the referendum concerning the UK’s membership of 
the EU is a suitable example. Undeniably, therefore, there is a need to evaluate the ECA’s 
communication of its methodology to the public. 
Before proceeding, a few disclaimers are necessary. First, it is beyond the present purposes to 
provide a technical assessment of the ECA’s methodology. Second, by no means the earlier 
remarks imply that the ECA should be adjusting its methodology to please the Eurosceptic 
audience in the EU; if anything, this would seriously and irreversibly harm its independence.148 
Nonetheless, third, the methodology is one thing, and the translation of these findings into clear 
messages another. Regardless of whether or not the ECA wishes (or had wished) to maintain a 
low or strictly technocratic profile,149 its outputs are evidently significant for citizens and 
stakeholders seeking to find out more about how the EU budget is spent.150  
The Treaties are silent on the ECA’s methodology: that is left to the institution to determine. 
A choice of this sort evidently protects the independence of the Court of Auditors in the 
performance of its functions. It cannot be said that the ECA selected its methodology arbitrarily 
and without substantial internal reflection, taking into consideration international standards.151 
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Let us now focus on the reliability, legality and regularity of the accounts. Concerning the 
results of the SoA exercise,152 the ECA has been able to deliver a positive opinion on the 
reliability of the accounts (of all the revenue and expenditure of the European Union) only 
since 2007, and has been unable (to date) to deliver a positive opinion on the legality and 
regularity of the transactions underlying the EU accounts – albeit noting improvements in the 
latest Annual Reports for the 2016 and 2017 budgets, which resulted for the first time in a 
‘qualified (rather than an adverse)’ opinion.153 A pivotal question in this exercise is what should 
be the acceptable error rate in payments from the EU budget. The ECA has fixed the 
‘quantitative materiality’ threshold at 2%; this is explained in the SoA methodology 
brochure,154 as well as in the more detailed financial and compliance audit manual.155 Both 
documents are available online. The notions of legality and regularity are also explained in the 
latter publication; in practice the ECA does not distinguish between the two concepts.156 The 
ECA claims that it follows international standards in its methodology,157 and commentators 
have also confirmed this158 or opined that the ECA’s negative opinions are partly explainable 
due to the ‘small sample size (which in its turn is due to lack of staff)’.159 The first international 
peer review also found that the ECA adheres to international standards regarding its SoA 
methodology.160 It is also noteworthy that the ECA acknowledged in the 2016 annual report 
that the ‘Commission’s estimates of levels of error are, in most cases, broadly in line with our 
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own findings’.161 Despite the above, it should also be underlined that additional views have 
been expressed as to how the ECA should be carrying out its compliance audit.162  
As already stated, a technical evaluation of the ECA’s methodology cannot be undertaken here. 
However, there is no sufficient evidence to conclude that the ECA has been ‘too independent’ 
in the selection of its methodology. By contrast, sufficient evidence exists that is has been at 
least fairly diligent, especially further to the pressure exercised upon it after the introduction of 
the SoA – it is remembered that the SoA was an external constraint imposed on the ECA to 
professionalise its work.163 Nor can it be inferred from the above that the ECA is not prepared 
to accommodate recommendations, especially by the European Parliament and the 
international peer reviews. Simultaneously, and understandably, its methodology is not 
universally accepted: different opinions have been expressed, which should and are being 
considered and evaluated by the ECA. Quite naturally, the most challenging aspect of the SoA 
is the review of the implementation of the budget by the member states.164  
This article will be slightly more critical, nonetheless, of the ECA’s communication of its 
findings to the public. In this respect, a key question that has to be answered is who are, indeed, 
the ‘key external stakeholders’ interested in the ECA’s outputs, and in particular in the Annual 
Report, which incorporates the SoA. For instance, the 2008 international peer review noted that 
these included ‘members of the Committee on Budgetary Control of the European Parliament, 
Commissioners, the Budget Committee of the Council, and Directors General of the European 
Commission’.165 These stakeholders gave a positive assessment of the ECA’s reports: they 
were presented in a neutral and objective tone, supported with sufficient auditing evidence and 
included the responses of the EU institutions.166 They added that they ‘place[d] a high level of 
confidence in the Court’s reports and in the professionalism of its audit staff’; moreover, the 
stakeholders and reviewers found the reports (and especially the Annual Report) to be ‘usually 
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clear, unambiguous, understandable, concise, and well organized’.167 Such positive assessment 
evidences the substantial work undertaken by members of staff at the ECA in the preparation 
and verification of the report. 
Simultaneously, albeit a peer review understandably focused on the EU institutions (and 
notably the DGs and committees responsible for the budget), the main audience of the ECA is, 
in fact, EU citizens. On this basis, it is no hyperbole to claim that the Annual Report (even in 
its present, improved form) is not effectively addressed to citizens, by rather to auditors. That 
being said, the ECA’s summary publication which introduces the annual report is significantly 
more accessible and clear in its messages.168 By this it is not suggested that the ECA should be 
sacrificing the quality of its reports, but rather that it should go to great lengths to actually 
translate these findings to an EU-wide audience, so that the performance of the EU and national 
administrations be more easily understood and evaluated. The ECA’s summary publication can 
serve as a useful guide in this direction. The author is not alone, unfortunately, in opining that 
the presentation of the Annual Report (and the SoA) requires careful re-examination: the 
former ECA President expressed similar views in late 2016, namely that the ECA should ‘foster 
closer links with European citizens’ in order to ‘help build trust in the EU institutions’, and 
improve the reports so that they become ‘attractive, user-friendly and accessible’.169 There are 
indirect ways to build trust, too, especially via the collaboration with the European Parliament 
and national parliaments.170 
To that end, the ECA could draw on practices adopted by other EU institutions and bodies, 
which have significantly invested in their communication policy, either via an improvement of 
the user-friendliness of the annual report171 or increased social media presence, proactive 
engagement with media and stakeholders – among others.172 In addition, there is also scope for 
the ECA to be more positive in its reports, where appropriate. In its 2016 Annual Report, for 
example, the ECA observed that ‘[o]ur overall estimated level of error improved compared to 
that of recent years but it continues to exceed our benchmark for materiality of 2%. 
Nevertheless, around half of 2016 expenditure was free from material error’.173 A related press 
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release also echoed a more positive tone.174 But there is clearly scope for more explicit 
acknowledgment of good financial performance. Again, interesting ideas can be borrowed from 
other EU institutions and bodies.175 The aforementioned positive remarks should be placed in 
the context of the ECA’s present aim to address this perceived gap. Indeed, one of the principles 
upon which the ECA’s reform176 is based is to better communicate the ECA’s role and work.177  
9. Conclusion 
This article assessed the legal framework surrounding the independence of the Court of 
Auditors. The debate on the budgetary reform in the EU brings to the fore, inevitably perhaps, 
the role of the ECA. If the future EU budget should be revisited in order to increase the EU 
added value and meet the taxpayers’ expectations, so too the levels of control over the 
implementation of the EU budget will have to be re-examined. In this context, the article argued 
that the primary constitutional justification behind the ECA’s independence is its mission to 
act on behalf of and defend the EU interest. This was used as a basis upon which the various 
dimensions of independence were assessed. 
Thus, and excluding the appointment process, the existing legal framework can generally be 
deemed sufficient to ensure an appropriate level of independence. There are areas where such 
independence is manifested more effectively; elsewhere, adjustments are needed. More 
specifically, Article 286 TFEU stipulates that any other occupation is incompatible with the 
office, and that Members should behave with integrity once they assume their post. The ECA’s 
extensive Code of Conduct, monitored by the President and the Ethics Committee, imposes 
further obligations regarding the declaration and publication of financial and other interests. 
Importantly, the Code, as well as the Implementing rules, were drafted by the ECA itself; this 
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international peer review conducted in 2013, as well as to Parliament’s recommendations in the aforementioned 
resolution (n 48). See: www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/Structure.aspx, as well as ‘Understanding the reform of the 
ECA’, available at: www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/ECA_REFORM/ECA_REFORM_EN.pdf. 
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 See also an interview with the ECA’s current President who, before assuming office, opined, among others, 
that ‘there is still room to improve public perception. The problem lies with the impact of our work’. Interview 
with Klaus-Heiner Lehne, ‘As I see it, I have three key tasks: to implement the reform of the ECA, to reform our 
products, and to boost the ECA’s external impact’ (2016) European Court of Auditors Journal, No 10, p. 6. See 
also the ECA Strategy for 2018-2020 (available at: www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/Strategy.aspx); one of the key 
goals is ‘to get clear messages across to our audiences’. 
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obviously entails significant discretion and autonomy. The independence from member states 
is mainly guaranteed via the extensive information and audit rights granted to the ECA under 
Article 287(3) TFEU. Simultaneously, pragmatic limitations exist as to the overall possible 
impact of the ECA’s control at the domestic level, owing to the existing budgetary 
arrangements in the EU and the fact that most of the EU budget is, in essence, managed by 
domestic authorities. In this context, loose, non-hierarchical forms of cooperation with SAIs 
may provide partly satisfying solutions. Nonetheless, the ECA’s independence can be 
augmented by reducing the scope of information rights that the Members presently enjoy under 
the Implementing rules, regarding activities carried out and interviews given by colleagues in 
their own country. Regarding the EU institutions, the author finds that the Court of Auditors 
has rightly resisted to accommodate certain of the recommendations of the Budgetary Control 
Committee, insofar as those would turn the ECA into an organ of the European Parliament. 
On the appointment process, the European Parliament’s Budgetary Committee has developed 
a detailed list of criteria which clearly are not always taken into consideration by the Council. 
This contribution argued that granting the European Parliament a right of consent is 
indispensable as it would enable thorough scrutiny of the proposed candidates as to both their 
independence (primarily – but not exclusively – from their member state), as well as their 
suitability for the office. Moreover, the EU interest should be prioritised in Parliament’s 
considerations: to take a hypothetical example, it is not a foregone conclusion that a candidate 
with an excellent résumé in auditing will necessarily act on behalf of the EU interest when 
assuming office. If anything, examples exist where past Members pushed an agenda that would 
turn the ECA into the SAI of their respective member state, despite the divergence in auditing 
traditions and mandates across Europe. Precisely in light of these traditions, as well as the 
ECA’s inescapable need to cooperate with or even rely on national authorities, a fully 
convincing case has not been made as to why the number of ECA Members should be 
drastically reduced and why, consequently, the ECA should diverge, in terms of composition, 
from the Commission and the CJEU. If anything, the suitability of candidates for the post 
should matter more than their overall number: this is why priority should be given to changing 
the rules in the appointment process, and evaluating the impact of such amendment in due 
course.178 
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 While this is not the main reason why the prioritisation of a different appointment process is advanced in this 
contribution, it should be noted that pragmatically, it can only be anticipated that member states will be more 
likely to accept a more meaningful role for the European Parliament than losing their Member.  
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Moreover, the paper considered the ECA’s openness as regards its methodology and the clarity 
of its findings (without, however, providing a technical assessment of the former). Especially 
post-Maastricht and in light of the greater responsibilities entrusted upon the ECA via the SoA, 
there is no sufficient evidence to conclude that the ECA’s methodology is not recognised 
internationally. What is more, several stakeholders in the 2008 peer review evaluated positively 
the accuracy and coherence of the ECA’s reports. However, the last part of the paper provided 
a rather critical assessment of the ECA’s communication policy and the clarity of its findings 
in the Annual Report and the SoA more specifically. On this point, one may be excused for 
thinking that in the past, the ECA perhaps conflated the concept of independence with absence 
of engagement with the EU public. The technocratic functions of an institution cannot amount 
to lack of openness and accessibility. Over the last years, the ECA has taken steps to shorten 
this distance. Underlining that EU citizens are, in fact, the ECA’s main audience, the article 
invited the Court of Auditors to continue taking steps with a view to becoming even more 
accessible and understandable in its outputs.  
